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Abstract
Collaborative, or participatory governance is an increasingly commonmeans of addressing natural
resource issues, especially in the AmericanWest where patchworks of public, private, and tribal
interests characterize the region’s resources. In this context, unlikely alliances, or partnerships among
diverse actors who have historically been at odds, have a growing potential to shape social and
ecological outcomes, for better orworse.While these unlikely alliances have received greater attention
in recent years, relatively little research hasworked to synthesize the concept across diverse contexts
anddisciplines. Based on a reviewof the literature onunlikely alliances in natural resource governance,
we develop a framework that synthesizes the individualmotivations and contextual factors that
influence their formation, as well as the social and ecological outcomes that they create.We use this
framework to analyze six illustrative cases of unlikely alliances. Our analysis of these cases suggests that
unlikely alliances in the AmericanWest are likely to arise in the presence of a crisis, when appropriate
leadership is present, when some of the actors have interacted effectively in the past, andwhen actors
need to pool resources. The cases also illustrate some common outcomes, including environmental
improvement, transformation of social networks, policy change, and shifts in power relationships.We
discuss the implications of unlikely alliances for the social-ecological future of the AmericanWest.
Our paper highlights the role of unlikely alliances in shaping patterns of natural resource governance,
and provides a focus for further research in this realm.
1. Introduction
Some argue that given the patchwork of public,
private, and tribal resources in the AmericanWest, the
best way to protect working landscapes and conserve
broad-scale ecological function is through collabora-
tive conservation (Charnley et al 2014) and participa-
tory governance (Newig and Fritsch 2009). Yet
collaborations are costly, management resources are
limited, and not all collaborations yield similar impact
(Bodin 2017). Thus, understanding how collabora-
tions form and what makes them successful has been a
longstanding objective in the scholarship of natural
resource governance. In this paper, we focus on a
specific aspect of collaborative governance: the
phenomenon of unlikely alliances. Unlikely alliances
are partnerships among diverse actors who have
historically been at odds. They typically work together
to take advantage of the perceived benefits of building
bridges across traditional divides, often uniting
around common ground and taking advantage of
changes in the balance of power or evolving institu-
tional arrangements. As unlikely actors interact in
novel ways, the associated processes of cultural
production and negotiation, and subsequently their
impacts, become increasingly complex (Robbins et al
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2009). We are thus motivated by the need to move
beyond simple acceptance of collaborative processes
and themantra of participatory governance asmeeting
all manner of objectives (Huffman 2009, Berry and
Mollard 2010) to consider what novel aspects of
collaboration occur when unlikely partners come
together. In particular, we explore how these unlikely
alliances are driven by the motivations of various
actors, the broader context in which they occur, and
the positive and negative social and ecological out-
comes they produce. In short, we are responding to
Koebele’s (2019b) call to examine the changing land-
scapes of coalitions associated with collaborative and
participatory governance.
Unlikely alliances, sometimes called strange bed-
fellow coalitions (Phinney 2017), are intended to take
advantage of bridging traditional divides. But exactly
what sort of diversity is involved in an unlikely alli-
ance? In a study of unlikely alliances where tribal orga-
nizations partnered with non-Native organizations,
Grossman (2005) understood an unlikely alliance spe-
cifically in terms of the affiliation of participants. In
addition to participant affiliation (or professional
identity), Phinney (2017) also found that diversity
extending across policy domains, geographic origins,
and based on differences in ideologies (or belief sys-
tems) occurred within such alliances. Further, unlikely
alliances can target various situations and venues. For
example, unlikely alliancesmay develop in response to
litigation, as an alternative to litigation, as a means to
change policy, or as a means to reformulate imple-
mentation of policy. While recognizing that diversity
is multifaceted, that differences exist not only among
groups but also within groups, and that alliances may
shift rapidly or be characterized by highly fluid inter-
actions (Koebele 2019a), we focus here on unlikely
alliances that encompass partners who fundamentally
differ in some respects but still choose to ally with one
another to achieve some end. By their nature, then,
unlikely alliances incorporate a diversity of interests,
identities, belief systems, and/or experiences. What-
ever the source of the actors’ differences, as diverse
partners work together towards common ends an
unlikely alliance is forged, alongwith a shared recogni-
tion that traditional boundaries have been spanned.
The American West is a unique setting for explor-
ing the role of unlikely alliances. This region possesses
a cultural tradition of independence and liberty
(Kitayama 2010) and is made up of a mosaic of jur-
isdictions organized around varying, even contra-
dictory,missions andmandates (Sheridan 2007)These
features create divides among natural resource own-
ers, managers, and other stakeholders. Nevertheless,
large amounts of public land are dedicated to multiple
use and have a mandate of public participation that
requires distinct groups to interact. Additionally,
many of the most pressing resource challenges in the
West require coordination across landscapes and
boundaries (Rickenbach et al 2011, Burr 2013). These
lands support 75 million people, and are currently
under an existential threat from wildfire, unstable
water resources, and invasive species. Thus, the region
serves to both create a context for the formation of
unlikely alliances, as well as to elevate their potential to
impact communities, ecosystems, and livelihoods.
Based on a review of the literature on unlikely alli-
ances in environmental governance, we developed a
framework (figure 1) for characterizing these alliances
focused around three critical questions: (1) What are
actors’motivations in forming an unlikely alliance? (2)
What contextual, or situational factors are associated
with the formation of unlikely alliances? (3) What are
Figure 1.Conceptualmodel displaying the structure of the framework for a simplified unlikely alliance. Actormotivations and
contextual factors are fundamental in determiningwhether disparate social worldsmerge into an unlikely alliance. Those alliances in
turn impact social-ecological outcomes in away that each actor individually (dotted lines) is unable to do.Note that in real-world
contexts, unlikely alliances often engagemore than two perspectives. For comprehensive identification of each of the framework
components, seefigure 3.
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the social-ecological outcomes of unlikely alliances? In
what follows, we first provide a brief overview of our
framework and a brief introduction to a number of
cases in western natural resource governance (figure 2)
that we use to illustrate this framework.We then expli-
cate the framework in more comprehensive detail
(figure 3), interspersing specific examples from the
cases throughout (sections 2–4). We conclude with a
discussion of the role of unlikely alliances in future
social-ecological systems of the American West
(section 5).
1.1. Framework and cases
Frameworks have been used in the literature on social-
ecological systems to specify variables of interest to
researchers and the relationships among them. Frame-
works attempt to specify major relevant concepts
needed to understand the broader topic of interest
(Emerson and Nabatchi 2015) The purpose of our
framework is to provide an organizing structure for
scholars of collaborative and participatory governance
interested in particular in the role of unlikely alliances,
both with respect to synthesizing previous scholarship
as well as identifying areas of future research. Our
framework was constructed directly from our review
of the literature on unlikely alliances, and is thus
intended to be a reflection of how the literature has
treated unlikely alliances to date, rather than
demonstrate our own priorities as researchers. The
framework is organized around three fundamental
aspects of unlikely alliances. The first component
explores themotivations of actors that drive formation
of alliances. The second component of our framework
examines the contextual factors that impact whether
or not unlikely alliances form. We identify a range of
both social and ecological contextual factors that
predispose the formation of unlikely alliances. Finally,
our third framework component relates to outcomes
of unlikely alliances. We consider a broad range of
potential outcomes, acknowledging that as actors with
varying motivations come together in novel arrange-
ments, a variety of outcomes are possible. These
outcomes might impact both the environment and
social structures in both positive and negative ways,
and impacts to different actors may differ substan-
tially. In the section about implications we discuss
various challenges involved in assessing outcomes,
that arise from issues of case selection, causal identifi-
cation, and accuratemeasurement of outcomes.
We illustrate our framework using examples from
a number of cases. While these cases are not intended
to be exhaustively representative, we selected the cases
to cover a range of geographic regions, resource types,
issues related to those resource types, and variation
with respect to the number and diversity of individuals
involved. Some of these cases have been described in
Figure 2.Map of 16 states of the AmericanWest displaying the location of the seven cases of unlikely alliances. Each alliance is colored
by resource type. Information in each box identifies the alliance, the relevant timeframe, the actors involved, and the goal of the
alliance.
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peer-reviewed literature. For other cases, our descrip-
tions are based on personal experience (often deep or
prolonged) with the alliance. The purpose of present-
ing the cases is to help explicate our framework and its
range of application using concrete examples. Com-
bined with the literature review underpinning our fra-
mework, we think that the cases serve to illustrate
some of the claims we make about unlikely alliances.
While we do not intend an in-depth examination of
each case, based on the application of the framework
to our set of cases, we draw some initial conclusions of
the broader implications of unlikely alliances on
social-ecological systems in theWest. Below we briefly
introduce each case, organized by resource manage-
ment type.
We include three cases from rangeland systems.
The first involves the California Rangeland Conserva-
tion Coalition (CRCC), which in 2005 brought toge-
ther environmentalists, regulators and ranchers who
were typically at odds regarding land use and livestock
grazing to protect working ranchlands for their value
to both ranching communities and wildlife. Our sec-
ond rangeland case is the Owyhee Initiative (OI),
which tackled previously intractable public land con-
flicts, such as motorized recreation, cattle grazing, and
wilderness designation, through active participation of
more than 40 organizations with a history of opposing
viewpoints on these debates. The Initiative resulted in
a consensus agreement among local, regional, and
national groups that ‘promotes the ecological and eco-
nomic health of Idaho’s Owyhee County.’ Finally, the
Thunder Basin Grasslands Prairie Ecosystem Associa-
tion (TBGPEA) in eastern Wyoming, formed in 1999,
is a landowner-led non-profit with the stated purpose
‘to provide private landowner leadership in develop-
ing a responsible, common sense, science-based
approach to long-term management of their lands.’
Over two decades, TBGPEA worked proactively with
federal agencies, conservation groups, and scientists to
develop a progressive, habitat-based approach to the
conservation of multiple wildlife assemblages on pri-
vate lands. The alliance surrounding TBGPEA’s efforts
Figure 3. Framework identifying themotivations, contexts, and outcomes of unlikely alliances.
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incorporates a diversity of participant affiliations, in
particular including both private and public actors
with energy, rangeland, and conservation interests
that have traditionally held divergent goals and
viewpoints.
We include two cases related to water resources. In
the late 2000smore than 45 organizations and agencies
from northern California and southern Oregon came
together as a result of an unusual opportunity to
remove a dam and transform water rights and water
flows in the Klamath River. The Klamath Basin settle-
ments (KBS) were developed by an unlikely alliance
involving a broad array of participant affiliations, pol-
icy domains, and ideologies, but jointly they were able
to develop and sign two agreements on water manage-
ment for the bi-state river. The second water-oriented
unlikely alliance is the Great Basin Water Network
(GBWN), which is united by a shared opposition to a
proposed project that would divert major amounts of
groundwater in rural areas to Las Vegas. Actors within
the network vary based on geographic origins (some
are urban, others rural, some are from Nevada, others
from Utah), by ideologies (some are oriented toward
ranching as a means of economic preservation, others
have basic interests in environmental preservation,
and still others in social and environmental justice),
and by participant affiliation (some are Indian tribes,
others are religious groups, others are rural groups,
and still others are environmental groups).
We include one case involving forest resources,
from the White Mountains in eastern Arizona. This
case follows the White Mountain Stewardship Project
(WM), a group of national agency employees, tribes,
private landowners, environmental non-profits, and
forestry industry groups. This collaboration came
together, bridging disparate objectives, ideologies, and
economic and environmental platforms, in order to
prepare for and mitigate damage from increasing
wildfires.
2.Why ally with diverse partners?
Our literature review uncovered several factors that
motivate individual actors to engage in unlikely
alliances (figure 3). One specific motivation is to
enhance credibility; this can take a number of forms. It
might involve projecting a signal of strength to other
actors, creating an aura of legitimacy (Phinney 2017),
or be intended to gain access to decision-making
authority (Weible and Sabatier 2009) some cases,
actors choose to join alliances to undercut existing
power asymmetries, thereby enhancing their credibil-
ity. This might entail allying to avoid or confront a
common enemy (Grossman 2017, Koebele 2019a), or
attempting to break stalemates where the opposition is
viewed as especially strong (Phinney 2017). Alterna-
tively, alliances can also serve to reduce uncertainty for
policymakers about the potential consequences of a
decision, thereby improving the credibility of the
outcome (Phinney 2017). Interestingly, credibility
enhancement may also be directed inward—alliances
can enhance an actor’s own sense of credibility,
especially when allying with partners who do share
some, but not all, beliefs (Weible et al 2018).
Credibility enhancement and undercutting exist-
ing power asymmetries played an important role in
several cases (table 1). In the creation of the GBWN,
where diverse allies with relatively less power and
influence banded together in opposition tomore pow-
erful governmental institutions—the Southern
Nevada Water Authority and the Las Vegas Valley
Water District. In the Klamath Basin settlements,
actors with more to lose, or those considered to have
skin in the game, had enhanced credibility, which
turned out to be significant to the negotiation process
as well as to the outcomes (Horangic et al 2016). In the
case of the Owyhee Initiative, local actors with less
power in certain national policy processes were moti-
vated to alignwith actors that hadmore power in those
spheres in order to enhance their own credibility and
be included in the process. Our findings align with
conclusions by Schlager and Blomquist (2008) and
Berry andMollard (2010) that political conditions and
power relations are implicit in decisions made about
participation. More specifically we find that allying
with diverse partners has been used as a means of
enhancing credibility and undercutting existing power
asymmetries. Another motivation for engaging in
unlikely alliances is related to accessing scarce resour-
ces, whether to secure access to the other party’s valu-
able resources (Koebele 2019a), or to stake a claim to
general resources that are limited (Weible et al 2018),
or to collaboratively access shared resources. The alli-
ance can support the use of resources to achieve com-
mon objectives, such as the use of public or private
funds to conserve privately-owned resources through
deed restrictions or enhancement projects (Barry et al
2007). Resources can promote organizational capacity
in alliances that support research or policy that could
not be maintained alone (Huntsinger et al 2014), to
gain access to professional competence (Weible et al
2018), to extend the range of tactics or activities avail-
able to an actor (Phinney 2017), or to streamline per-
mitting processes (Huntsinger et al 2014). Finally,
resources can serve informational or educational pur-
poses, such as creating access to information or infor-
mation pools (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Heikkila
and Gerlak 2019) or promoting learning (Heikkila and
Gerlak 2019, Koebele 2019a).
Given the various forms that resource-basedmoti-
vations can take, unsurprisingly, it was one of the
more commonly observed motivations in the cases we
examined. For example, ranchers and energy produ-
cers worked together in Thunder Basin to pool resour-
ces in their efforts to proactively approach the
potential ESA listing of sensitive species. Very simi-
larly, environmental groups in California realized that
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they would have to work with ranchers in order to
achieve their conservation goals, because so much of
rangeland is ecologically important but privately
owned in California. Thus, they were motivated to
form the California Rangeland Conservation
Coalition.
Another motive to join an unlikely alliance may
result from understanding another actor’s values in a
novel way. When an actor finds a new way to under-
stand another party’s values that previously seemed
conflicting, this can create an opportunity to forge new
and common ground through an unlikely alliance by
creating a linkage between seemingly disparate issues.
In this way, when another actor’s political, economic,
or cultural values with respect to an environmental
conflict are seen in a new light (Berry and Mol-
lard 2010) or when resource values are convincingly
communicated or demonstrated (Huntsinger et al
2014), there may be extra motivation to develop an
unlikely alliance.
Actors involved in the Owyhee Initiative started to
recognize the importance of developing common
values, despite seemingly disparate interests at the out-
set of the process; this served as amotivation formain-
taining their involvement after reaching consensus on
an initial agreement. The Klamath Basin settlements
provided a venue for formerly antagonistic actors to
come together after a number of them understood one
another’s values better through participating in a ser-
ies of listening sessions and interacting in a small-scale
restoration project (Gosnell and Kelly 2010). An
important motivation behind the formation of the
GBWN was the creation, use, and articulation of a
common sense of place to create linkages between
actors (Whear 2015).
In certain circumstances, previous negative
experiences can act as an incentive to expand beyond
one’s usual allies and develop different alliances (Hor-
angic et al 2016). For example, previous failures in
resolving conflicts along the Klamath River changed
some of the actors’ strategic motivations, providing an
incentive to participate with different actors in an unli-
kely alliance during the 2010 Klamath Basin negotia-
tions (Gosnell andKelly 2010,Horangic et al 2016).
One potential motivation that we uncovered in
our literature review, that we found relatively little evi-
dence of in our actual cases, involves the outcome-
based importance of showing that some progress is
possible. This might involve allying to signal to others
that, in particular if a difficult stalemate exists, that at
least a little progress can be made (Phinney 2017). It is
notable that even if an actor might not think they can
benefit directly from an alliance, or that the alliance
will uncover a specific solution, they might be moti-
vated to ally in some preliminary form out of a lack of
any other viable alternatives. Likely, one reason we see
Table 1. List of framework components for each case. ‘X’ indicates the case provides evidence of that framework component. (Note
that, due to space constraints, not all evidence is discussedwithin the text.)TBGPEA—Thunder BasinGrasslands Prairie Ecosystem
Association.OI—Owyhee Initiative. CRCC—California RangelandConservation Coalition. KBS—Klamath Basin Settlements.
WM—WhiteMountain Stewardship Agreement. GWBN—Great BasinWaterNetwork.
TBGPEA OI CRCC KBS WM GBWN
Motivations Enhance credibility X X X
Undercut power asymmetries X X
Access resources X X X
Link disparate issues X X X
Previous failure or negative experience X X X X X
Demonstrateminimal progress X
Contexts Environmental or social crisis X X X X X X
Appropriate leadership X X X X
Previous history of alliance X X X
Ample time to build relationships X X X X
Broadly relevant conflict X X X
Uncertainty about outcomes X X X
Boundary spanners X
Polycentricity X
Identity can be put to the side X
Outcomes Environmental improvement X X X X X X
Improved trust/social network ties X X X X
Policy or regulatory change X X X X
Pooling resources and information X X X X
Changes in beliefs or behavior X
Change in power relations X X X
Greater use of science X X X
Lost time,money, and/or resources X X
Social learning X X X
Economic improvement X
Lower-commondenominator solution
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little evidence of this motivation in our set of cases is
that it is difficult to assess in a retrospective review of
cases, in particular in a set of cases that were successful,
at least to some extent.
3. Inwhat situations are unlikely alliances
expected?
The second component of our framework examines
the broader situational or contextual factors in which
unlikely alliances are expected to form. In many cases,
individual motivations and broader contextual factors
are overlapping. For example, individuals might be
motivated to engage in an unlikely alliance in order to
reduce conflict. Similarly, the context of intense,
protracted conflict might predispose an unlikely
alliance as the only possible means of making some
progress. Despite the potentially overlapping nature of
motivations and contextual factors, we consider each
separately since they represent different lenses and
combinations of external and internal drivers.
One of the most important situational factors our
review uncovered is the existence of an environmental
or social crisis, or even an anticipated environmental
or social threat (Olsson et al 2007). Such a crisis, or
external threat, can often serve to transform align-
ments among actors in a conflict, turning previous
enemies into allies. This crisis might be felt by all of the
actors, when external pressures are generally high for
all involved (Emerson et al 2012), but might also apply
to only one actor, such that the impacted party feels
that their best recourse is to ally (Grossman 2017).
This type of situation is sometimes described as a hurt-
ing stalemate, as when stakeholders are dissatisfied
with the status quo but also have no other venues for
achieving their objectives (Weible and Sabatier 2009).
In the Klamath Basin Settlements, for example, one of
the actors said ‘I’d be lying if I did not say that we were
hurting. That was a factor, the fact that we were not
winning. We had already tried everything else’ (Hor-
angic et al 2016, p 1428).
We found evidence of this factor in almost all of
our cases, as many of them involved real or perceived
imminent crises. Some were related to impending reg-
ulation, as in the case of Thunder Basin and the Owy-
hee Initiative (Crapo 2004). In Thunder Basin, the
possibility of endangered species listings was a critical
factor driving the formation of new alliances, and the
product of the unlikely alliance directly addressed this
potential threat. In other cases, alliances formed in
response to ongoing threats or crises, as for the wild-
fires of eastern Arizona in the White Mountains, or
conflict around water in Nevada. The impact of such
crises or threats can be very strong and can serve to
completely transform previous relationships. For
example, the destruction wreaked by the recent
Rodeo–Chediski Fire in Arizona, to that point the lar-
gest wildfire in state history, made evident the threat of
future wildfires, bringing together actors that had pre-
viously held highly divergent views on how best to bal-
ance conservation and production of timber resources
(Sitko andHurteau 2010).
One example of a contextual factor involving the
presence of a specific type of individual is that of
appropriate leadership. When leadership emerges that
recognizes the value of novel perspectives and
encourages people to step outside their traditional
boundaries by building trust, connecting people, by
pursuing alternate ways of management, or by ensur-
ing broad-based engagement, unlikely alliances are
more common (Olsson et al 2006, Bohlen et al 2009,
Walker 2018).
We found evidence of the importance of appro-
priate leadership in many of our cases, coming from a
variety of sources or types of individual. The Owyhee
Initiative was promoted in important ways by involve-
ment from Senator Crapo and his office; the Senator
personally believes in ‘collaboration’ as an approach to
wicked problems and told individual actors he would
support any legislation needed to implement a con-
sensus agreement among diverse groups at the local
level (Crapo 2004). Governmental representatives
were also important to the California Rangeland Con-
servation Coalition. Steve Thompson, then US Fish
andWildlife Service Southwest RegionDirector, urged
collaboration between ranchers and envir-
onmentalists (Shigley 2006). Thompson’s guiding
mantra to participants was to find the 80%of concerns
that can be agreed upon and not to waste time arguing
about the other 20%. Leadership also arises outside of
formal governmental authority. For example, rancher
Tim Koopmann hosted the first meeting of coalition
partners and served as an example to other ranchers,
having recently negotiated a mitigation easement with
the California Department of Fish and Game (Hunt-
singer et al 2014, CCRC 2015). Similarly, leadership
and long-term commitment by rancher Betty Pellatz
was central to the formation and persistence of the alli-
ance in Thunder Basin (Homes 2013).
Another contextual factor that our review uncov-
ered is the degree to which there is a previous history
of unlikely alliance in that same system and between
the actors in question. A similar or identical alliance in
the past that has worked on some other initiative can
predispose actors to come together in alliance again
(Whear 2015). In the case of the Owyhee Initiative,
some actors had a previous history of working toge-
ther on difficult landmanagement challenges and con-
flicts. For instance, some environmental groups
worked with community members to limit low-alti-
tude flights over the region from a nearby Air Force
base (Anon n.d.). Similarly, a number of the indivi-
duals involved in the GBWN had a history of unlikely
alliance because, starting in the early 1980s, they
worked together and formed a network to resist the
siting of the MX Missile Project in central Nevada
(Whear 2015).
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Timing can be a critical factor in whether or not an
unlikely alliance forms, and how effective it is. When
there is ample time to develop relationships, or for
working on the details of the particular problem at
hand, then unlikely alliances are more possible (Hor-
angic et al 2016, Walker 2018). Conversely, if there is
toomuch time between themoment of decision-mak-
ing and the implementation of the actual decision
beingmade, this can instead act as a disincentive to the
formation of an unlikely alliance (Horangic et al 2016).
The alliance in Thunder Basin required nearly 20 years
to come to a formal fruition—in this time, actors were
able to develop close and trusting relationships that
served as the foundation for the eventual formal
agreement.
The breadth of the conflict is another critically
important factor that can impact the formation of an
unlikely alliance. If conflict is viewed as widely relevant
to a range of interests (Mahoney 2007, Phinney 2017),
or jurisdictions (Gerlak and Heikkila 2011), then an
unlikely alliance may be more likely. The Owyhee
Initiative resulted after conflict reached a breaking
point—external pressure for a sweeping 2.7 million-
acre National Monument that would cover half of the
county’s area created an imminent turning point in
the region. This broadened the potential impact of the
conflict to encompass a diverse range of stakeholders
and brought them together in opposition to this new,
external threat. The GBWN translated well beyond the
immediate context and as such, brought a diversity of
organizations together because the conflict was viewed
aswidely relevant.
Uncertainty about the outcomes of a situation can
also be a motivating contextual factor in the develop-
ment of an unlikely alliance. If the current strategies
adopted in environmental governance appear to lead
to ineffective approaches or uncertain outcomes, unli-
kely alliances may arise to mitigate these issues (Emer-
son and Nabatchi 2015). For example, in the case of
the Owyhee Initiative, uncertainty about how a pro-
posed National Monument would impact local deci-
sion-making and land use garnered regional interest to
find a viable land tenure solution that would provide
greater certainty about impacts to local stakeholders.
Conflicts involving groundwater use generally involve
uncertainty about the amount of groundwater avail-
able, the degree to which pumping in one area will
impact water availability in another area, or how long
an impact will last. Recognizing that impacts from the
proposed project to pump and transfer groundwater
were uncertain served to unite some of the project
opponents within the GBWN, who believed that pro-
ject proponents needed to provide greater certainty
about the impact to groundwater so that local resi-
dents and the environment would not be left to suffer
the consequences (Welsh et al 2013).
When present, boundary-spanning actors, or
actors that create bridges between the boundaries of
different social groups, can catalyze the development
of unlikely alliances (Gerlak and Heikkila 2011,
Koebele 2019a). Boundary spanners can serve a num-
ber of important specific functions. They can act as
neutral intermediaries seen as apolitical or without a
direct interest in a conflict in question, thus serving as
catalysts to facilitate across governance interests (Barry
et al 2007). Similarly, they can provide an arena for
trust building, learning, collaboration, or conflict
resolution (Hahn et al 2006). They can transform insti-
tutional capacities bymaking organizationsmore flex-
ible and dynamic (Olsson et al 2004), creating space
for institutional innovation and improving organiza-
tional capacity to deal with change (Olsson et al 2007).
For instance, in the Owyhee Initiative, a conservation
organization that had a history of working collabora-
tively with ranchers played an important role of brid-
ging the interests of ranchers and environmental
groups focused onwildlife orwilderness designation.
We found that polycentric, or multi-layered, insti-
tutions have been implicated in the formation of unli-
kely alliances. Polycentric policy arenas involve
multiple centers of decisionmaking at various scales of
jurisdiction, operating independently (Ostrom 2010).
This can create the need to coordinate management
interventions within and across multiple scales of gov-
ernance, predisposing actors to engage in unlikely alli-
ances (Sabatier et al 2005, Benson et al 2013).
Similarly, unlikely alliances may form when there are
opportunities for understanding and servicing needs
in spatially heterogeneous contexts (McGinnis 1999),
when scale-dependent governance challenges as well
as cross-scale interactions need to be addressed
(Young 1994, Berkes 2002), or when, despite the chal-
lenges of coordination and administration, possibi-
lities for moderating vertical interplay among
institutions exist (Berkes 2002, Young 1994, Lebel et al
2006). In the review of our own cases, we did not
uncover many explicit examples of polycentric gov-
ernance. The Owyhee Initiative, however, did involve
multi-layered institutions that had a history of allying
with other unlikely parties at different scales of gov-
ernance (e.g. local, state, national).
A final contextual factor in the formation of unli-
kely alliances are situations when the actors acknowl-
edge, but then choose not to focus on big issues, such
as identity, racism, sovereignty, ideology, etc, which
might divide them if they became more central (Hor-
angic et al 2016, Grossman 2017). In the case of the
Klamath Basin settlements, the sovereignty of the four
tribes was significant and was recognized (Gosnell and
Kelly 2010), but did not become the focus. Nearly all
the actors in the Klamath Basin settlements indicated
that putting aside issues of identity, ideology, environ-
mental ethics, and racism was necessary so they could
emphasize andmake progress on their common inter-
ests in the protection of and appropriate use of natural
resources (Horangic et al 2016).
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4.What are the outcomes of unlikely
alliances?
The final component of our framework for under-
standing unlikely alliances involves the outcomes that
arise from them.Here, we consider a range of potential
impacts, both positive and negative, social and ecolo-
gical, accruing to communities and individuals.
Given that any specific alliance is often motivated
by a particular environmental problem, improve-
ments to that issue are a natural possible outcome.
Environmental outcomes are challenging to measure,
and evenmore difficult to conclusively attribute to any
particular process (Koontz and Thomas 2006, Thomas
andKoontz 2011). Furthermore, environmental bene-
fits often depend on the perspective of the actor, or on
one’s framing of the problem (Emerson and
Nabatchi 2015). While some environmental impacts
are plainly beneficial to all actors, many accrue dis-
proportionately to specific actors. Notwithstanding
these challenges, in all of our cases we found pre-
liminary evidence of the importance of anticipated or
perceived environmental improvements. For exam-
ple, the Owyhee Initiative led to improved planning,
regulation, and enforcement of motorized recreation
use across the fragile sagebrush steppe ecosystem. The
White Mountain Stewardship Project resulted in
improved forest conditions and wildlife habitat in the
region, along with increased songbird densities and
understory herbaceous vegetation (Sitko and Hur-
teau 2010). Stewardship participants acknowledged
that the long-term effects of treatments on forest
structure could not be measured, but they did report
reduced fire risk around communities. Conservation
plans created by TGBPEAmembers in Thunder Basin
included specific and measurable on-the-ground con-
servation actions. This diversity of environmental
impacts demonstrates the potential range of unlikely
alliances.
Unlikely alliances can impact the development of
trust and social networks in important ways, for exam-
ple, via an increase in the number or improvement in
the quality of relationships actors have. This can
involve meeting and developing relationships with
actors from different backgrounds, thereby opening
lines of communication which may have value in
future conflicts (Rudeen et al 2012, Walker 2018). The
diversified networks found in our cases led to an expli-
cit recognition of improved trust and expanded social
networks. For Thunder Basin, an increase in trust
among the unlikely allies has resulted from sustained
engagement and the multi-decadal development of
networks of relationships among the actors. A similar
process occurred in the Owyhee Initiative, where
actors continue to remain involved and active a decade
after the initial agreement.
Power relations can change as a result of an unli-
kely alliance, including adjusting, manipulating, or
upending of the existing power dynamics
(Purdy 2012). In addition, policy andmarkets can shift
in ways that allow local users to maintain access to
resources and benefits inways that shift power dynam-
ics (Huntsinger et al 2014). In both of our focal cases
involving water governance, power relations shifted
with the formation of the unlikely alliances. The devel-
opment of the GBWN facilitated a coalescence of legal,
economic, and scientific expertise, which in turn
influenced the power dynamics and allowed the pro-
ject opponents in the unlikely alliance to achieve sev-
eral of their key goals. Actors negotiating in the
Klamath Basin Settlements were aware of the means
through which all players exerted power as well as
recognizing how parties who were not participating in
negotiations exerted power. Simultaneously, many
actors appreciated their involvement in an unlikely
alliance that shaped the overall dynamics of power and
made possible finding a mutually-acceptable solution
(Horangic et al 2016). These examples demonstrate
both how unlikely alliances can be produced by shifts
in the balance of political power but also serve to trans-
form that balance themselves.
Many unlikely alliances change regulation or pol-
icy. For example, some unlikely alliances can provide
new legal protections and regulatory relief to actors,
which result from agreements made by an unlikely
alliance. Similarly, policy change can result, such as
when parties from different coalitions engage in coor-
dination towards common, complementary, or at least
minimum, non-interfering policy goals (Jenkins-
Smith et al 2018). Legal protections were particularly
important in the case of Thunder Basin, where a pri-
marymotivation of rancher and energy industry parti-
cipation was to gain protection from the threat of
species being listed under the Endangered Species Act
via enactment of Candidate Conservation Agree-
ments. These agreements provide participating land-
owners with safe harbor from Endangered Species Act
requirements in the event that a species is listed. In the
case of the negotiated settlements in the Klamath
Basin these were intended to guide federal agency
actions aswell as congressional legislation.
Another outcome involves changing the narrative
used in interpreting policy issues in ways that appeal to
a diversity of actors; this can lead to greater cohesion
and influence (Wilson 2006, Lejano and Ingram 2009).
Such social learning within unlikely alliances, which
here we take to mean ‘a change in understanding that
goes beyond the individual to become situated within
wider social units or communities of practice through
social interaction,’ (Reed et al 2010) can also subse-
quently facilitate exchange of information. These
exchanges can be more impactful when more diverse
actors are connected in an unlikely alliance (Gerlak
and Heikkila 2011) and are often most pronounced
when actors have different belief systems (Siddiki et al
2017). Indeed, transformational ideasmay arise from a
mix of ideas and sectors that occur within an unlikely
alliance (Heikkila and Gerlak 2019). In our cases, the
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California Rangeland Conservation Coalition created
new narratives around conservation that recognized
the health of California rangelands and the diversity of
species they support as largely due to grazing and other
land stewardship practices employed by the ranchers
that own andmanage these lands.
A related impact occurs when individuals change
their beliefs or behaviors as a result of an unlikely alli-
ance. Belief change can occur when previously diver-
gent beliefs converge, somewhat or completely, as a
result of interactions that take place during an unlikely
alliance (Weible and Sabatier 2009). Furthermore,
belief change may subsequently result in behavioral
change, such as with the adoption of a new manage-
ment practice or program. In particular, if a number of
stakeholders agree to a specific recommendation or
decision, that recommendation is subsequently more
likely to be adopted by a broader range of people
(Ulibarri 2015).
Greater trust in scientific information represents a
specific type of belief change that individuals might
experience (Weible and Sabatier 2009). In our cases,
we found evidence of increased use of scientific infor-
mation in alliances that had critical participation by
scientists or those that prioritized the use of science in
some way. For example, in Thunder Basin, actors
placed a high priority on scientific information. This
focus ultimately led to the formation of the Thunder
Basin Research Initiative, a stakeholder-driven colla-
borative research program involving multiple uni-
versity and federal research entities.
In many instances, pooling of resources or infor-
mation can promote greater efficiency in achieving
goals for unlikely alliances (Olsson et al 2004). For
example, the Owyhee Initiative established a Con-
servation and Research Center that is able to collect
landscape-scale ecological data and use it to inform
decision-making in ways that were not previously
possible.
Only one case explicitly reported economic
improvement. This was theWhiteMountain Steward-
ship project, where a strong motivation for the project
was to facilitate environmental health and economic
opportunity simultaneously.
All of the impacts outlined above have been bene-
ficial. Yet it is important to note that potential impacts
of unlikely alliances can also be detrimental. One
example of an important potential negative impact is a
lowest-common denominator solution, or a form of
group-think, whereby in order to agree with each
other, all parties have to make sacrifices and the final
result actually makes a situation worse than if the alli-
ance had never existed. We did not find strong evi-
dence of this type of lowest-common denominator
solution in any of our cases. Another important nega-
tive impact of an unlikely alliance is the fact that by
their nature, they require a substantial investment of
time and resources on the part of the actors involved.
This is an important consideration, in particular
because as alliances continue, the cumulative cost of
time invested increases. For example, the multi-dec-
adal process involved in TBGPEA cost actors a huge
amount of time and money. Similarly, while the Owy-
hee Initiative is serving as a model of success in Idaho
and beyond, some participants have indicated they
would not have the capacity to recreate the Initiative in
other regions, given the large time commitment it
involved.
5. Implications for theAmericanWest
Our framework underscores the idea that unlikely
alliances have important implications for social-ecolo-
gical systems in the American West. The formation of
unlikely alliances can bring a diversity of resources to
bear on a problem and can spread the geographic
extent of responses. Broad-scale environmental chal-
lenges, meanwhile create common threats that may
bring formerly disconnected managers together. Eco-
logical systems thus have the potential to both drive
and respond to unlikely alliances. Understanding
feedbacks between these social and ecological
dynamics is important for predicting where unlikely
alliancesmay form, and how they will impactmanage-
ment decision-making and ecological conditions. Our
framework provides a systematic means of under-
standing those interactions.
While unlikely alliances are not a new phenom-
enon, few previous studies have attempted to synthe-
size information about unlikely alliances across
disciplines and resource sectors. Our case analyses in
particular indicate that unlikely alliances in the Amer-
ican West have led to novel environmental solutions,
reductions in power imbalances, enhanced trust
among diverse actors, and strengthened social net-
works. Our findings suggest that leadership, resource
pooling, and long-term commitment in the face of real
or perceived crisis are critical factors related to unli-
kely alliance formation. These results reveal broad
commonalities across disparate fields and sectors and
confirm that unlikely alliances have the potential to
transform conflicts, environmental outcomes, and
social relationships within the context of natural
resource governance in the AmericanWest.
As illustrated by our example cases, unlikely alli-
ances can reorganize social dynamics, in particular
through building trust and social networks, facilitating
social learning, and via changes to policy. Despite the
fact that alliances are fluid and often narrowly focused
on one policy process, they can succeed in building
durable and trusting relationships among actors, even
after the conclusion of the target policy process. Trust
is an important forerunner to principled engagement
among diverse actors that supports additional colla-
borative efforts in the face of future conflicts or crises
(Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). These coalitions there-
fore could also assemble more quickly and efficiently
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in the face of a new challenge. Long-term alliancesmay
also shift who is thought of as an unlikely partner.
After almost 15 years of working together, many in
California no longer view themembers of the CRCC as
unlikely. The mechanisms by which unlikely alliances
reorganize social relationships, and the durability of
these changes, will shape their impacts on environ-
mental governance.
The potential for social learning among unlikely
alliances indicates that traditional ways of thinking
about the West and the divides that those ways of
thinking engender could also be reimagined through
an unlikely alliance. For instance, the rangeland cases
presented here suggest that alliances may play an
important role in breaking down longstanding divides
between environmentalists and ranchers. Does the
prevalence of unlikely alliances in rural land manage-
ment mean that this fifty-year history of conflict will
come to a close? Or will rural actors align in new ways
to form stronger and more frequent opposition to
urban interests, intensifying polarization on a new
axis? The answer probably depends on who is not ally-
ing, and how, if at all, the alliance has shifted where
power resides. A key issue for future research, there-
fore, will be better understanding how alliances reor-
ganize not only environmental relationship but
conflicts, and the extent to which these reorganiza-
tions remain primarily local, or become situated in the
broader landscape of the AmericanWest.
Many of our cases resulted in new policy or regula-
tion, suggesting that alliances could be an avenue to
transform the context within which environmental
policy has been mostly stagnant in the Western US
since passing of 1970s environmental legislation. This
avenue of using unlikely alliances to adapt policies
could be important not only to create more relevant
and effective strategies to address current environ-
mental stressors, but could also play an important role
in upending the intractable and polarized conflicts
that have built up around this policy context. The
extent to which unlikely alliances might transform
national, rather than strictly local, policy debates
remains an open question.
As landscape-scale environmental changes pro-
gress, contributing to cross-boundary challenges such
as diminished water resources, wildfires, and biologi-
cal invasions, landscape-scale management responses
are increasingly necessary. Conditions and events on
neighboring lands impact a jurisdiction’s exposure to
environmental stressors. This imposes limits on the
effectiveness of efforts to restore, monitor, and protect
ecosystem services and environmental functions if
such activities stop at jurisdictional boundaries. As our
framework and cases illustrate, unlikely alliances can
extend management efforts across a landscape scale,
matching them to environmental challenges and
bringing the combined resources and knowledge of
multiple actors to bear on common challenges. As
environmental crises in the West become more
frequent, unlikely alliances may also become increas-
ingly common.
There are a number of reasons to remain cautious
about the conclusions we present here. One potential
issue is that it is unclear whether our subset of cases is
representative of the broader set of unlikely alliances in
the American West and beyond. While most of the
unlikely alliances we examined resulted in positive
outcomes, the literature on unlikely alliances is sparse,
and given the possibility that successful cases are more
visible to researchers than unsuccessful cases, itmay be
that negative outcomes are much more common than
our investigation of existing publications and case
examples suggests. Another challenge involves accu-
rately measuring both social and environmental out-
comes, as well as understanding the long-term
durability of those outcomes. Furthermore, the inher-
ent complexity involved in systems of environmental
governance means that multi-scalar, cross-jurisdic-
tional feedbacks complicate our ability to cleanly iden-
tify causal relationships.
As a result of limited data availability, it is not yet
possible to do a systematic or quantitative assessment
of the effectiveness of unlikely alliances relative to
other forms of collaboration. Given their potential for
positive impacts, a fruitful avenue for future research
could explore ways to enhance the formation and per-
sistence of unlikely alliances in the American West.
Future research could also work to compare the out-
comes of unlikely alliances to those of more standard,
‘likely’ alliances in natural resource governance. Does
the alliance facilitate or change the group’s interest in
and ability to resolve other outstanding issues or con-
flicts? If so, how long do these impacts last? Given the
challenges and complexities outlined above in under-
standing unlikely alliances, key advances in our under-
standing will potentially be generated by scholars who
use creative methods to overcome these challenges,
particularly in light of the declining efficacy of survey-
based research. Innovations in methodology may
involve combining qualitative and quantitative meth-
ods in interesting ways, for example pairing ethno-
graphy with computational modeling (Koch et al
2019) orfield experiments (Levy Paluck 2010).
In conclusion, we anticipate that unlikely alliances
could become more prevalent as socio-environmental
challenges continue to escalate. As the impacts of cli-
mate change progress, Western land managers are
faced with increasingly complex problems and
increasingly limited resources to address them. These
challenges impact the individual goals and needs of a
wide diversity of actors, but also cross boundaries and
are larger in scope than any single jurisdiction. As a
result, these difficulties spur cooperation and colla-
boration across jurisdictions, agencies, and sectors,
suggesting that unlikely alliances will become more
abundant as impacted actors seek tools and strategies.
Developing a better understanding of how and when
these alliances form, as well as their outcomes (both
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positive and negative), is an important line of con-
tinued inquiry and may enable westerners and their
allies to better shape, guide, and leverage unlikely alli-
ances formutually beneficial results.
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